# My Understanding of Moravecs Position I'm going to start by outlining the position that Moravec expressed in his article [Simulation, Consciousness, Existence](Simulation,%20Consciousness,%20Existence.pdf)[^3]. I encourage you to read the article yourself, if only to make up your own mind about just what exact claims Moravec made and if you agree with them. But, I've tried to fairly and faithfully reconstruct his core argument here. For the rest of this section I will be articulating Moravec's position and holding off on introducing my counter arguments in order to give him a fair shot. With that said, his original article, while certainly thought provoking, was unnecessarily tangled. I have restructured it to make it easier to follow. ###### A Physical Fundamentalist Who Cannot Rule out Solipsism It is helpful to start at Moravec's philosophical foundation. He views himself as a "physical fundamentalist": > [!quote] > During the last few centuries, physical science has convincingly answered so many questions about the nature of things, and so hugely increased our abilities, that many see it as the only legitimate claimant to the title of true knowledge....I myself am partial to such “physical fundamentalism.” Although he only describes this position briefly, we can infer that is a [Superset](Superset.md) of [Physicalism](Physicalism.md), [Scientism](Scientism.md), and [Reductionism](Reductionism.md). He then proceeds to concede that we cannot *logically* rule out any of the variants of [Solipsism](Solipsism.md), such as [Descartes Evil Demon](Descartes%20Evil%20Demon.md) or a [Brain in a Vat](Brain%20in%20a%20Vat.md). > [!quote] > Physical fundamentalists, however, must agree with René Descartes that the world we perceive through our senses could be an elaborate hoax. In the seventeenth century Descartes considered the possibility of an evil demon who created the illusion of an external reality by controlling all that we see and hear (and feel and smell and taste). ###### Simulations Moravec then begins to make claims about [Simulation](Simulation.md): > [!quote] > A simulated world hosting a simulated person can be a closed self-contained entity. It might exist as a program on a computer processing data quietly in some dark corner, giving no external hint of the joys and pains, successes and frustrations of the person inside. Inside the simulation events unfold according to the strict logic of the program, which defines the “laws of physics” of the simulation. The inhabitant might, by patient experimentation and inference, deduce some representation of the simulation laws, but not the nature or even existence of the simulating computer. The simulation’s internal relationships would be the same if the program were running correctly on any of an endless variety of possible computers, slowly, quickly, intermittently, or even backwards and forwards in time, with the data stored as charges on chips, marks on a tape, or pulses in a delay line, with the simulation’s numbers represented in binary, decimal, or Roman numerals, compactly or spread widely across the machine. There is no limit, in principle, on how indirect the relationship between simulation and simulated can be. While he never gives a precise definition, we can infer that in his view the events of a simulation unfold according to the strict [Logic](Logic.md) of the [Program](Program.md), which define the [laws of physics](laws%20of%20physics.md) of the simulation. In other words, what matters are the [Intrinsic](Intrinsic.md) relationships - the [Rules](Rules.md) or [Constraints](Constraints.md) being followed and the entities that follow them. Simulations do not depend on an observer: they will proceed and any [Conscious](Consciousness.md) inhabitants will experience their virtual lives whether or not they are externally interpreted. A simulated world hosting a simulated person can be a closed self-contained entity. It might exist as a program on a computer processing data quietly in some dark corner, giving no external hint of the joys and pains, successes and frustrations of the person inside. > [!quote] > Conscious inhabitants of simulations experience their virtual lives whether or not outsiders manage to view them. They can be implemented in any way at all. A simulations internal relationships would be the same if the program were running on any computer with any storage device. The computer could be slow or fast, it could pause for hours at a time, it could even run backwards[^4]. Likewise, the data could be stored as charges on chips, marks on tape, or pulses in a delay line, with the simulations numbers represented in decimal, binary, or Roman numerals, compactly stored in one physical area or spread widely across the machine(s). There is not limit, in principle, on how indirect the relationship between simulation and simulated can be. Effectively, Moravec is just making use of [Computational](Computation.md) [Universality](Universality.md) (via a [Universal Computer](Universal%20Computer.md)). %%This is his "entry point" into the idea that a physical rock could simulate something. He is trying to show that a simulation and the physical substrate that it is being simulated on can be quite disconnected%% ###### Translation and Interpretation, Encoding and Decoding Moravec then states that a process implements or [Encodes](Encoding.md) a simulation if there is a way of [Decoding](Decoding.md) or [Translating](Translation.md) it into a recognizable form. A simulation can only be [Interpreted](Interpretation.md) via an additional program that [Translates](Translation.md) the simulations internal representations into external representations convenient for external observers. As the relationship between the elements inside the simulator and the external representation become more complicated, the decoding process may become impractically expensive. > [!quote] > Today’s simulations, say of aircraft flight or the weather, are run to provide answers and images. They do so through additional programs that translate the simulation’s internal representations into forms convenient for external human observers. Yet, there is no obvious cutoff point. Why not accept all mathematically possible decodings, regardless of practicality? An [Interpretation](Interpretation.md) of a simulation is just a mathematical mapping between states of the simulation process and views of the simulation meaningful to a particular observer. [In Principle](In%20Principle.md) this can be done by a huge theoretical lookup table that contains an observers view for every possible state of the simulation. > [!quote] > What does it mean for a process to implement, or encode, a simulation? Something is palpably an encoding if there is a way of decoding or translating it into a recognizable form. Programs that produce pictures of evolving cloud cover from weather simulations, or cockpit views from flight simulations, are examples of such decodings. As the relationship between the elements inside the simulator and the external representation becomes more complicated, the decoding process may become impractically expensive. Yet there is no obvious cutoff point. A translation that is impractical today may be possible tomorrow given more powerful computers, some yet undiscovered mathematical approach, or perhaps an alien translator. Like people who dismiss speech and signs in unfamiliar foreign languages as meaningless gibberish, we are likely to be rudely surprised if we dismiss possible interpretations simply because we can’t achieve them at the moment. Why not accept all mathematically possible decodings, regardless of present or future practicality? This seems a safe, open-minded approach, but it leads into strange territory. This observation is disturbing because there is always a table that takes any particular situation - for instance, the idle passage of time - into any sequence of views. This means that it is not just computers, *but anything at all* that can be viewed as a simulation of any possible world. This line of thought, growing out of the premises and techniques of physical science, has the unexpected consequence of demoting physical existence to a derivative role. A possible world is as real, and only as real, as conscious observers, especially inside the world, think it is! > [!quote] > An interpretation of a simulation is just a mathematical mapping between states of the simulation process and views of the simulation meaningful to a particular observer. A small, fast program to do this makes the interpretation practical. Mathematically, however, the job can also be done by a huge theoretical lookup table that contains an observer’s view for every possible state of the simulation. > > The observation is disturbing because there is always a table that takes any particular situation—for instance, the idle passage of time—into any sequence of views. Not just hard-working computers, but anything at all can theoretically be viewed as a simulation of any possible world! We are unlikely to experience more than an infinitesimal fraction of the infinity of possible worlds, yet, as our ability to process data increases, more and more of them will become potentially viewable. Our ever-more superintelligent progeny will be able to make increasingly huge interpretive leaps, far beyond anything now imaginable. But whether or not they are ever seen from outside, all the possible worlds are as physically real to any conscious inhabitants they may contain as our world is to us. > > This line of thought, growing out of the premises and techniques of physical science, has the unexpected consequence of demoting physical existence to a derivative role. A possible world is as real, and only as real, as conscious observers, especially inside the world, think it is! ###### Consciousness > [!quote] > Our consciousness may be primarily the continuous story we tell ourselves, from moment to moment, about what we did and why we did it. It is a thin, often inaccurate veneer rationalizing a mountain of unconscious processing. Not only is our consciousness-story a weak reflection of physical and brain reality, but its very existence is a purely subjective attribution. Viewed from the physical outside, the story is just a pattern of electrochemical events, probably in mainly our left cortex. A complex psychological interpretation must be invoked to translate that pattern into a meaningful tale. From the psychological inside, the story is compelling because the psychological interpretation is an essential element of the story, its relationships enforced unconsciously by the interconnections of the storytelling neural machinery. > ###### Existence and Reality What is reality anyway? The idea of a simulated existence is the first link in our disturbing chain of thought. As stated previously, simulation of a world can be implemented in radically different data structures, processing steps, and hardware. If one interrupts a simulation running on one machine and translates it to another dissimilar computer, the simulations intrinsics, including the mental activity of any inhabitants, continue blithely to follow the simulated physical laws. Only external observers would notice if the new machine runs at different speed, scrambled order, or requires elaborate translation to make sense of its actions. > [!quote] > What is reality, anyway? The idea of a simulated existence is the first link in our disturbing chain of thought. Just as a literary description of a place can exist in different languages, phrasings, printing styles, and physical media, a simulation of a world can be implemented in radically different data structures, processing steps, and hardware. If one interrupts a simulation running on one machine and translates its data and program to carry on in a totally dissimilar computer, the simulation’s intrinsics, including the mental activity of any inhabitants, continue blithely to follow the simulated physical laws. Only observers outside the simulation notice if the new machine runs at a different speed, does its steps in a scrambled order, or requires elaborate translation to make sense of its action. A simulation of the weather can be viewed as a set of numbers being transformed incrementally into other numbers. Most simulations then have separate external viewing programs that interpret the internal numbers into externally meaningful form - say pictures of evolving cloud patterns. However, the simulation will proceed with or without any such external interpretation. If a simulation’s data representation is transformed, the computer running it steps through an entirely different number sequence, although a correspondingly modified viewing program will produce the same pictures. There is no objective limit to how radical the representation can be, and *any simulation can be found in any sequence, given the right interpretation*. A simple clock simulates the evolving state of a complex world when interpreted via a world-describing playbook or movie frames keyed to clock ticks. Even the clock is superfluous, since an external observer can read the book or watch the movie at any pace. If the interpretation of a simulation is a dispensable external (in other words, the simulation will proceed without interpretation), while its core implementation can be transformed away to nothing, in what sense can a simulated world be said to exist at all? > [!quote] > A simulation, say of the weather, can be viewed as a set of numbers being transformed incrementally into other numbers. Most computer simulations have separate viewing programs that interpret the internal numbers into externally meaningful form, say pictures of evolving cloud patterns. The simulation, however, proceeds with or without such external interpretation. If a simulation’s data representation is transformed, the computer running it steps through an entirely different number sequence, although a correspondingly modified viewing program will produce the same pictures. There is no objective limit to how radical the representation can be, and any simulation can be found in any sequence, given the right interpretation. A simple clock simulates the evolving state of a complex world when interpreted via a world-describing playbook or movie frames keyed to clock ticks. Even the clock is superfluous, since an external observer can read the book or watch the movie at any pace. If the interpretation of a simulation is a dispensable external, while its core implementation can be transformed away to nothing, in what sense can a simulated world be said to exist at all? > [!quote] > Our own world is among this vista of abstractly conceivable ones, defined by the formal relationships we call physical law as any simulation is defined by its internal rules ###### Rocks Are Conscious Perhaps the most unsettling implication of this train of thought is that anything can be interpreted as possessing any abstract property, including consciousness and intelligence. Given the right playbook, the thermal jostling of the atoms in a rock can be seen as the operation of a complex, self-aware mind. Common sense screams that people have minds and rocks don’t. But interpretations are often ambiguous. The rock-minds may be forever lost to us in the bogglingly vast sea of mindlessly chaotic rock-interpretations. Yet those rock-minds make complete sense to themselves, and to them it is we who are lost in meaningless chaos. Our own nature, in fact, is defined by the tiny fraction of possible interpretations we can make, and the astronomical number we can’t. > [!quote] > Perhaps the most unsettling implication of this train of thought is that anything can be interpreted as possessing any abstract property, including consciousness and intelligence. Given the right playbook, the thermal jostling of the atoms in a rock can be seen as the operation of a complex, self-aware mind. How strange. Common sense screams that people have minds and rocks don’t. But interpretations are often ambiguous. > > No particular interpretation is ruled out, but the space of all of them is exponentially larger than the size of individual ones, and we may never encounter more than an infinitesimal fraction. The rock-minds may be forever lost to us in the bogglingly vast sea of mindlessly chaotic rock-interpretations. Yet those rock-minds make complete sense to themselves, and to them it is we who are lost in meaningless chaos. Our own nature, in fact, is defined by the tiny fraction of possible interpretations we can make, and the astronomical number we can’t. ###### Summary of HM's Core Argument Alright, I'll now summarize the main line of Moravec's argument: 1. A simulation is defined by the strict logic of the program that defines it's "[laws of physics](laws%20of%20physics.md)". These rules create the intrinsic relationships that *are* the simulation. 2. Simulations do not depend on observers: a simulation will proceed with or without any external interpretation. 3. Because a simulation is defined by it's internal relationships, it is indifferent to the substrate it is run on, as well as the substrate used for memory 4. A process encodes a simulation if there is a way of decoding it into a form recognizable by external observers 5. An interpretation of a simulation is a mathematical mapping between states of the simulation process and views meaningful to a particular observer. This could be done by a huge lookup table. 6. Thus, anything at all can be viewed as a simulation of any possible world. 7. He believed he arrived at this conclusion via reasoning from the physical sciences 8. Because a simulation will proceed without interpretation, and its core implementation can be transformed away to nothing all all, can a simulated world be said to exist at all? 9. Taken to it's conclusion, the thermal jostling of rocks can be seen as a complex, self aware mind. Rocks are conscious. 10. These rock-minds make complete sense to themselves. --- Date: 20250301 Links to: Tags: References: * []()