# The Theory of Everything > ###### Central Idea $\;\;\rightarrow\;\;$ [We Must Seek Good Explanations](We%20Must%20Seek%20Good%20Explanations.md) Being able to predict things, or [describe](Description%20Is%20Not%20Explanation.md) them, however accurately, is not that same thing as *understanding* them. The [explanation](Explanations.md) is the entire content of a scientific theory. It's predictions are merely *consequences* that we can [deduce](Deduction.md) via the *explanation*. Predictions on their own are of limited utility, contrary to the false views of [Instrumentalism](Instrumentalism.md) and [Positivism](Positivism.md). We can see this in the thought experiment [The World is a High Tech Oracle](The%20World%20is%20a%20High%20Tech%20Oracle.md). Predictions are important only for conduction of crucial experimental tests to discriminate between competing scientific theories that have already passed the test of being good explanations. Passing experimental tests is only one thing a theory has to do, for [The Purpose of Science is to Explain the World](The%20Purpose%20of%20Science%20is%20to%20Explain%20the%20World.md). Saying it's purpose is prediction is to confuse means with ends, as if we were to argue the purpose of a spaceship is to burn fuel. We understand the fabric of reality only by [understanding theories](What%20it%20Means%20to%20Understand%20Something.md) that explain it. And since they explain more than we are immediately aware of, we can understand more than we are immediately aware that we understand. Our [Theories are Becoming Deeper and More General](Theories%20are%20Becoming%20Deeper%20and%20More%20General.md), giving us a chance to truly understand the fabric of reality. A real Theory of Everything will not simply *predict* everything. It must also *explain* everything. For that we cannot have a [reductionist](Reductionism.md) bias. A [reductionist](Reductionism.md) thinks that science is about analyzing things into components. An [instrumentalist](Instrumentalism.md) thinks that it is about predicting things. But we, and a Theory of Everything, [Must Seek Good Explanations](We%20Must%20Seek%20Good%20Explanations.md). The purpose of the high level sciences is to enable us to understand and explain [emergent phenomenon](Emergence.md), of which the most important are *life*, *thought* and *computation*. There are explanations at every level of the [reductionist hierarchy](Reductionism.md). Many of them are *autonomous*, referring only to concepts at that particular level (for instance, 'the bear ate the honey because it was hungry', not mentioning anything about the molecular composition of the bear, the fundamental forces keeping its body together, and so on). Many involve [deductions](Deduction.md) in the opposite direction to that of a reductive explanation - that is, they explain things *not* by analyzing them into smaller, simpler things, but by regarding them as components of larger, more complex things - about which we nevertheless have explanatory theories. We can see this in the explanation of how [How a Single Copper Atom came to be on the Tip of Winston Churchills Nose in Parliament Square](How%20a%20Single%20Copper%20Atom%20came%20to%20be%20on%20the%20Tip%20of%20Winston%20Churchills%20Nose%20in%20Parliament%20Square.md). The truly privileged theories are not the ones referring to any particular scale of size or complexity, nor the ones situated at any particular level of the predictive hierarchy — but the ones that contain the deepest explanations. The four strands that make up the Theory of Everything are: 1. [Quantum Theory](Quantum%20Theory.md) 2. [Epistemology](Epistemology.md) 3. [Evolution](Evolution.md) 4. [Computation](Computation.md) Such deep and diverse connections have been discovered between these four subjects that it has become impossible to reach out best understanding of any one of them without understanding the other three. --- Date: 20241201 Links to: Tags: References: * []()