# Interpretation of Simulations What does it mean to [Interpret](Interpretation.md) some process to be a [Simulation](Simulation.md)? For instance consider a planetarium simulating the night sky, or a [Flight Simulator](Flight%20Simulator.md), or [Terraforming Venus to Simulate Weather on Earth](Terraforming%20Venus%20to%20Simulate%20Weather%20on%20Earth.md). Should we interpret them as *real*? [Dr Johnsons Criteria](Dr%20Johnsons%20Criteria.md) tells us to interpret as real those complex entities which, if we did not interpret them as real, would complicate our explanations. So in the case of the flight simulator or a planetarium they both should be interpreted as real. They are complex and autonomous. They [Kick Back and Require an Independent Explanation](Kicking%20Back%20Requires%20an%20Independent%20Explanation.md). However, they are not *physically real* in the same way that the night sky or a real aircraft is real. This may seem like a contradiction but it is not. As explored in the [5 - Reality of Abstractions](5%20-%20Reality%20of%20Abstractions.md), we can have different types of real - such as physically real and abstractly real. Here we have entities that are computationally real, but not physically real. What about [Terraforming Venus to Simulate Weather on Earth](Terraforming%20Venus%20to%20Simulate%20Weather%20on%20Earth.md)? In that case we have a physical system - Venus - that is meant to simulate Earth. Surely since that is a physically real system the simulation is also real? But that is not so! That Venus is simulating Earth is an [*Interpretation*](Interpretation.md). The interpretation is an [Explanation](Explanations.md) of what is occurring. This requires an *interpreter*, and [Interpreters Make Use of Virtual Reality](Interpreters%20Make%20Use%20of%20Virtual%20Reality.md). All interpretation is a form of experience, and all experience is a form of virtual reality. So we see that any simulation can be seen as a physically real system (for all simulation requires computation and all [Computation is a Physical Process](Computation%20is%20a%20Physical%20Process.md)), and also interpreted via virtual reality. An interpretation is real as an abstraction. But wait! It may appear that we have just walked right into some muck. Does this mean that one is free to interpret Venus in *any way they'd like to*? Certainly *one* interpretation of Venus is that it is simulating Earth. Another is that it is just Venus. Another is that the gods are playing some divine game and trying to align the planets in order to achieve a high score. And so on. Thus it appears that we have trapped ourselves. We have said that interpretations are real as abstractions. But now we have certain interpretations that we know are real and others that we know are not. How do we get out of this? Where did we go wrong? The answer is explained in [Dr Johnsons Criteria](Dr%20Johnsons%20Criteria.md) when discussing the reality of angels. We *don't* regard angels as real because they *do not* factor in to our best [Explanations](Explanations.md). The same holds in our example of Venus. We are right to interpret it as simulating earth because that is part of our *best explanation*! Based on our best understanding, we have explanations around the *intention* of the engineers and scientists who worked on this terraforming project. We have an explanation of their goals and how they set out to achieve them, and our explanation states that they are attempting to have Venus simulate Earth. It is incorrect to interpret it as part of some game of the gods, because that is not part of our best explanation, or any good explanation at all. It is worth pausing to really drive this point home. We can *logically* interpret *anything* to be a simulation. This was expressed by Hans Moravec in his essay [Simulation, Consciousness, Existence](https://www.organism.earth/library/document/simulation-consciousness-existence). But as I explained in [Moravec's Mistake - Rocks Are Not Conscious](*Draft%201%20-%20Moravec's%20Mistake*.md), while we can logically interpret anything as a simulation, it is an exceedingly bad explanation to do so[^2]. By simply starting from the [Principles of Reason](Principles%20of%20Reason.md), we take on the principle that [We Must Seek Good Explanations](We%20Must%20Seek%20Good%20Explanations.md). And if we are seeking good explanations then we *cannot* interpret anything to be a simulation. Only those whose interpretation as a simulation *improve* our explanations! Thus, under the [Principles of Reason](Principles%20of%20Reason.md), it actually is not correct to claim that we *can* interpret anything as a simulation, we just *shouldn't*. Rather, we *can't* interpret anything as a simulation if we are seeking good explanations. [Rational Inquiry Requires Pursuing Good Explanations](Rational%20Inquiry%20Requires%20Pursuing%20Good%20Explanations.md), [Explanationless Progress is Impossible](Explanationless%20Progress%20is%20Impossible.md), and [Striving for Progress is our Most Fundamental Principle](Striving%20for%20Progress%20is%20our%20Most%20Fundamental%20Principle.md). ## But why is it a bad explanation? I think it is worth building up the argument around why interpreting *anything* to be a simulation is a bad explanation. ###### Problems First off, explanations solve [Problems](Problem.md). They are intimately linked to the [Problem Solving Process](Problem%20Solving%20Process.md). What problem does the theory that "anything can and should be interpreted as a simulation" solve? It solves *no problem*. ###### If it explains anything, it explains nothing Secondly, Moravec's theory is so vague that it can explain anything. And [If a Theory Can Explain Anything, It Explains Nothing](If%20a%20Theory%20Can%20Explain%20Anything,%20It%20Explains%20Nothing.md). Moravec's theory can be used to argue that some pile of rocks, *if interpreted correctly*, is actually a simulation of angels watching over humanity. Or it is a message from an extraterrestrial civilization that tells us they are coming to mine our planet and enslave us all. Or those rocks are really simulating a message from Zeus telling you that the reason ketchup squirted on your shirt was because he willed it so. By arguing that anything can be interpreted as a simulation, implicitly Moravec has taken on the notion that all interpretations are *equally valid*. This is not so. We are only right to regard our interpretation of something as being a genuine simulation *if it fits into our best explanation*. We can summarize this as follows. The interpretation of both a simulation, and of physical reality itself, requires virtual reality. In order to know if your interpretation is of an abstract entity (the interpretation of the abstract flight simulator) or a physical entity (the interpretation of physically real waves crashing into the shore on earth), will be based on your best explanation. If your best explanation says that the interpretation is of a physically real entity, then regard it as physically real. If your best explanation says that the interpretation is of an abstract simulated entity, then regard it as so. ###### If anything can be interpreted as a simulation, simulation means nothing If anything can be interpreted as a simulation, the concept of "simulation" becomes meaningless. A good explanation should be constrained, meaning it rules out possibilities. If every arrangement of particles can be interpreted as a simulation, the term "simulation" loses all explanatory power because it doesn't provide any constraints or mechanisms. It becomes a label applicable to any and all events. But, one may argue: "If we have 'discovered' that anything can be interpreted as a simulation, couldn't that be a deep *principle of reality*, just as we saw with [Virtual Reality](Virtual%20Reality.md) and [Self-Similarity](Self-Similarity.md)?". This is a great question, and the answer is no. The reason is that the deeper explanation of virtual reality never lost the narrow original meaning of the word. At its absolute core a simulation is a set of events that evolve via the strict [Intrinsic](Intrinsic.md) logic of a program, the internal [laws of physics](laws%20of%20physics.md). If we are trying to simulate some physical aspect of reality, then the objective is for the [laws of physics](laws%20of%20physics.md) of the simulation to approach [The Laws of Physics](The%20Laws%20of%20Physics.md). Any extended definition of simulation should still respect this, or we have changed it's fundamental meaning. So, while we could change the definition of simulation so that the phrase "anything can be interpreted as a simulation" is accurate, it requires us to discard the original meaning of simulation. This is bad because anyone who is trying to follow our arguments (including ourselves) will likely have cached ideas in their brain around simulation and it's *original* definition. And this means that we are likely holding $D_o$ (the original definition of simulation) and $D_u$ (the updated definition) in our heads at once, not realizing that $D_o$ and $D_u$ are [Contradictory](Contradiction.md). Additionally, in regards to [Virtual Reality](Virtual%20Reality.md) - we did *not* say that *everything* was virtual reality! Only that it is the basis for many things such as [Computation](Computation.md), mathematics, science, imagination and external experience. But there is still a whole physical reality that exists. ###### All interpretations are not valid Whenever we interpret anything we are using [Virtual Reality](Virtual%20Reality.md) to do so. *We* are identifying and interpreting meaning. But was that meaning already objectively out there, external to us? Well that depends on what our best explanations say. In the case of Venus simulating Earth, it was. If we interpret a pile of rocks to be a message from Zeus, then according to our best explanation that meaning is internal to us and lives in our brains running on a virtual reality [Program](Program.md). This aligns with [Dr Johnsons Criteria](Dr%20Johnsons%20Criteria.md). In the case of Venus or a planetarium, the complex and autonomous calculations are *external* to the virtual reality program being run in your mind that you use to interpret them. In the case of interpreting rocks to be Zeus's message, the complex and autonomous calculations are *internal* to the virtual reality program being run in your mind. They do no exist external to you, for you to interpret. You created and subsequently interpret them. But one may argue "even if it was *me* who created the simulation, is it any less real? It still exists as a complex and autonomous set of calculations. Just because it is being run as part of my virtual reality interpretation program does not make it any less real". And that is partly correct. The program being run in their mind is real for it *does* satisfy [Dr Johnsons Criteria](Dr%20Johnsons%20Criteria.md). It just *has nothing whatsoever to do with rocks*. When we run a computer program, due to the [Universality](Universality.md) of [Computation](Computation.md) we don't think that the resulting computation has a different interpretation based on the substrate the computation was performed on. The pile of rocks in this scenario has no meaningful explanatory role. None of the complexity lives in the rock. The program holds *all complexity* and is arbitrarily tied to the rocks. It just as easily could have been tied to a bucket of pinecones. They add *nothing* to our explanation and thus make it *worse*. Putting the above argument aside, using the rock as *keys* to the program wouldn't satisfy [Dr Johnsons Criteria](Dr%20Johnsons%20Criteria.md) for "keying" into a dictionary is not a complex computation. So we are right to regard the virtual reality program simulating Zeus as real. It is complex and autonomous. But we are wrong to interpret that this simulation has *anything* to do with rocks. Consider the stance "all interpretations are valid". Refuting this stance also prevents us from running head first into a [Bad Self-Reference](Self-Referential.md#Bad%20Self-Reference). For we already know that everything we experience is an interpretation, for [All Observations are Theory Laden](All%20Observations%20are%20Theory%20Laden.md). Now if we then believe that "all interpretations are equally valid" we have an issue - namely that "all interpretations are valid" is itself an interpretation! I can thus interpret it as true or false. If I interpret that as false I have a [Contradiction](Contradiction.md). Likewise, we avoid a slippery [Infinite Regress](Infinite%20Regress.md) by arguing all interpretations are not equally valid. If all interpretations are equally valid, then there is no basis for choosing among them, making it impossible to explain anything. For example, the interpretation "gravity makes things fall down" could just as well be interpreted as "gravity makes things float". These interpretations are equally valid if we believe that all interpretations are equally valid. Thus, the very act of choosing an interpretation would need to be interpreted, and there would need to be an interpretation for that interpretation, and so on. The would be no stable method for preferring one interpretation over another. Of course a person could exclaim "Aha! I am not caught in this infinite regress of which you speak, for I do not seek explanations! I have given up on explanations all together[^3]". This would certainly get them out of the infinite regress, but it also prevents all [Progress](Progress.md) for we are violating the [Principles of Reason](Principles%20of%20Reason.md). Notice that rejecting the theory that "all interpretations are equal" is the best way to stave off [Solipsism](Solipsism.md). If all meaning and complexity are "instilled" by the interpreter, it leads to a form of solipsism, where reality becomes subjective. If all that exists is a product of your interpretations, it becomes impossible to distinguish between your mind and the world around you. ###### Kicking back How would interpreting *anything* to be a simulation yield a "kicking back"? It would not. The kicking back would come from the complexity that you endowed that thing with. Put another way, the complexity would exist in your interpretation (the virtual reality program in your mind), not the external object itself. In a real simulation, the computations are external and autonomous, providing a genuine “kicking back” that gives the simulation its reality. The universe has the property of [Self-Similarity](Self-Similarity.md) that makes it possible for one thing to represent another. But with the theory "anything can be interpreted as a simulation" parts of external reality are not representing other parts of external reality - rather one is re-describing reality according to the arbitrary rules that were created. The external computation does not exist, all of the computation is *internal* to the interpretation program. This means that entity that you are interpreting is effectively just a description (the state of the rock) and lacks any explanatory power. That power lives entirely within your internal interpretation. You are creating a story about the rocks and their meaning, but the rocks themselves are not causing that meaning. Consider the example of [The Domino That Didn't Fall](The%20Domino%20That%20Didn't%20Fall.md). We can arrive at two explanations of this. The first is physics based: it did not fall because none of the patterns of motion initiated by knocking over the 'on switch' ever include it. This is effectively just a [Description](Description.md) and a bad explanation - however, it is a small part of the explanation and it is true. The second is abstract: it did not fall because the number 641 is prime. So we have multiple explanations of a phenomena, at different levels of emergence. Remember, [Description Is Not Explanation](Description%20Is%20Not%20Explanation.md). Now consider a rock being a video message from Zeus. If we look at the program, it will have dictionary keys that are from the rock. We could say the rock "caused" the program to have those exact keys. This is the reductionist explanation. But at a higher level emergence we can say that the program actually caused itself to have those keys, so it could represent what it wanted to. The program had [Intent](Intent.md). Also, the keys aren't a critical aspect of the program, and the rock isn't either. They both could be changed. This is similar to how the dominos could be changed. We weren't investigating the physics of dominos. Sure, there physics played a role in why one didn't fall, but we could have done this same experiment with transistors and tested the primality of 641 that way. Then, we would be asking "why isn't the state of this final transistor ever $1$?". In this way the program uses the rock just as genes and theories use physical objects to replicate themselves. Consider the descriptive explanation of the domino's failure to fall. Why is it a bad explanation? Because it doesn't really explain *anything*. It has a [Tautological](Tautology.md) nature and essentially states: "the domino didn't fall because it didn't fall". Imagine watching a person jump from the top of the Empire State building. Later that day you see them out walking the streets of New York and ask them "how are you alive?", only for them to answer "because nothing has killed me yet". While that is true, it isn't the explanation you were looking for (it turned out they had a parachute to decelerate their fall). Furthermore, this could be applied to *anyone*. It is just describing the *state* of the person, without explaining *why* they are in that state. In the case of the domino, it is explaining lack of motion by referencing lack of motion! ###### A Dictionary Is a Bad Explanation We can continue this line of thought. For the moment lets put the idea of having rock states be keys to some dictionary. For now, let the video message of zeus simply be a massive dictionary stored on a computer mapping a point in time to a frame of the video. This is simply a description. It is not an explanation! It does not explain *how* these frames were generated, or why Zeus is talking to us, and so on. A good explanation would consist of the program that *generated* the message. Perhaps that was a set of video equipment that the True Zeus did indeed use to film the message. Or perhaps it was a a computer programmer who generated this message as part of an elaborate scam. Either way, the dictionary is a bad explanation. It is essentially an arbitrary mapping between rock states and frames of the Zeus video. There is no underlying reason, no causal connection, or no logical necessity for the particular mappings to exist. You could easily create a different dictionary that maps different rock states to different video frames or even a completely different video. This lack of necessity or constraint is a hallmark of a bad explanation Now let us return to the idea of rock states as dictionary keys. In this case the program has simply imposed that meaning onto the rocks. The "meaning" is not discovered or revealed within the rocks by the program. It is imposed by the program itself. The program is not interpreting the rocks, but simply using them as a way to access some pre-determined output. Consider an analogy to language. The rocks, in this context, can be thought of as a language, which is merely a representation. The important thing is the meaning that is being conveyed via this representation. Languages are a way of mapping one concept to another that is useful within the context that the language was developed for. But the meaning of the message is not intrinsic to the representation itself; it is the idea, the concept that is conveyed. Similarly, with the rocks, the meaning does not arise from the rocks themselves, but the output that they are mapped to. The same thing occurs in the case of genes using the physical substrate of DNA in order to encode certain aspects of the world. Is it correct to say that the interpretation program was designed around those rocks and their states. In other words, the rock states provide specific keys to our dictionary. In a sense the program was [Adapted](Adapted.md) to those rock states. Is it a reasonable counterargument to say that, because the program is tied to those rock states, the rock states have meaning? No it is not. We could just as easily have adapted the program to the states of a pile of trash. While it's true the program was designed (and thus adapted) to recognize specific rock states, this doesn't mean the rocks possess the meaning. The adaptation is a design choice, not a discovery of pre-existing meaning within the rocks. The program's designer chose to map specific rock arrangements to specific video frames, but that was an arbitrary choice, and there is no meaningful relationship that was revealed in that process. The program has imposed that mapping, it did not discover it as if it were somehow present in the rocks prior to being interpreted. We can contrast this to entities that are properly adapted to other entities. When this happens, and say entity A (a white fox) is adapted to entity B (the cold snowy tundra), both entity A and B play critical roles. We could not simply swap out B for C (a equatorial jungle) and expect A to remain that same. If A tried to adapt to C it would drastically change A. In that sense, we can say that our program isn't truly adapted to the rocks. If it were, then if we changed the rocks the programs _output_ would change. But, we know that we could change the rocks to a pile of trash and, while the keys would need to be remapped, the output would remain the same. True adaptation involves a deep interdependence between entities. The program's relationship to the rocks is not one of true adaptation. The program was designed to read specific rock states, but it does not rely on any intrinsic properties of the rocks to operate. The mapping of rock states to video frames was arbitrary, a design choice. As I pointed out, you could replace the rocks with a pile of trash, and with a remapping of the "keys," the program's output would remain the same. This is not true for the fox in a jungle. This shows that the program's function is not dependent on the specific input of the rocks; it only needs a set of symbols that it can use to access its dictionary. The program's output is determined by the logic and the dictionary it contains, not by any properties of the rocks themselves Notice how related to the encoding of knowledge in physical substrates by genes (in DNA) or theories (books, computer programs, images, etc). ###### Interpretation is about *Explanation* What does it meant to interpret something? In a sense it means to say "there exists some entity that I must understand in a certain way based on my *best explanation*". When we interpret something, we are essentially constructing a theory about what it is an how it works. For instance, we interpret dots in the sky as "white-hot, million-kilometer spheres" only after conceiving of that idea. The meaning of an object arises from the best available explanation of it, not from a pre-existing, objective meaning. Imagine someone who is interpreting a pine tree to be Zeus. This is an example of running a virtual reality program in ones mind (i.e. it is their imagination). The person is using the concept of Zeus to explain certain aspects of the tree. But this "Zeus" theory is less effective than explaining the tree as a natural object because the "Zeus" explanation would fail to fit into our explanations of the physical world. The best interpretation is the one that provides the most complete explanation. In this view, interpretation and meaning are not static, but constantly evolving. This does not mean that anything goes, however. An interpretation must be part of a larger explanatory framework to be effective. The interpretation of a tree as Zeus does not fit within a larger explanatory framework, so it will be rejected as a poor explanation. Note that this does not say that the virtual reality program that the person is running in their mind is not real. It just says that it is a bad explanation to try and link it to the tree. For it to be linked to the tree it must solve some problem and improve our explanations. If one wanted to interpret a tree as zeus, it would need to be the case that there is some problem that is solved by my doing so. And that solving that problems improves our explanation. Put another way, something about the tree and zeus requires an [Independent Explanation](Kicking%20Back%20Requires%20an%20Independent%20Explanation.md) that links them, and that improves our overall explanation --- Date: 20250113 Links to: Tags: References: * []() [^2]: This is exactly what went wrong with [Dust Theory](Dust%20Theory.md) [^3]: This is the tact that was taken by [Post Modernism](Post%20Modernism.md), [Moral Relativism](Moral%20Relativism.md) and [Positivism](Positivism.md), among many another philosophies.