# Reductionism **Reductionism** is the view that all scientific explanations are *reductive*. A **reductive** explanation is one that works by analyzing things into lower level components. The reductionist conception leads naturally to a classification of objects and theories in a **hierarchy** (similar to the [Hierarchy of Theories](Hierarchy%20of%20Theories.md)), according to how close they are to the ‘lowest-level’ predictive theories that are known. In this hierarchy: * Logic and mathematics form the immovable bedrock on which the edifice of science is built. The foundation stone would be a reductive ‘theory of everything’, a universal theory of particles, forces, space and time, together with some theory of what the initial state of the universe was. * The rest of physics forms the first few stories. * Astrophysics and chemistry are at a higher level, geology even higher, and so on. * The edifice branches into many towers of increasingly high-level subjects like biochemistry, biology and genetics. * Perched at the tottering, stratospheric tops are subjects like the theory of evolution, economics, psychology and computer science, which in this picture are almost inconceivably derivative. The classification is a *mistake*. Microscopic laws and phenomena are no more fundamental than [emergent](Emergence.md) ones. The reason for this is that we are looking for the deepest [Explanations](Explanations.md) that provide the most *understanding*. Consider [How a Single Copper Atom came to be on the Tip of Winston Churchills Nose in Parliament Square](How%20a%20Single%20Copper%20Atom%20came%20to%20be%20on%20the%20Tip%20of%20Winston%20Churchills%20Nose%20in%20Parliament%20Square.md). Even if we could come up with an explanation in terms of particle trajectories for why that copper atom ended up there, that wouldn't really explain *why* it was there. It effectively would be a *prediction* at that point. It would take the form: "given these initial conditions of these X atoms and these fundamental laws of physics, it is predicted that the copper atom will end up at this specific location". But even then we don't really know *why* it has ended up there - only that it was inevitable that it would. We can argue against this reductionist hierarchy from a different vantage point as well. Consider this: why do we believe mathematics and logic would form the bedrock? That is a [Philosophical](Philosophy.md) question. Determining the reliability of a field of knowledge requires grappling with philosophical questions about the nature of truth and justification: * What does it mean for a statement to be true? * What criteria should we use to determine whether a belief is justified? These are fundamentally philosophical questions that cannot be answered solely within the framework of mathematics, or fundamental physics for that matter. They have no choice but to appeal to philosophy. But now look at what just happened - all at once we have said: * By philosophical reasoning, we conclude there is a hierarchy of theories, with mathematics and logic as the most foundational, followed by fundamental physics, and so on. Philosophy would be at the top, deemed the most derivative. * Thus we happily use the "most derivative" theory to perform the ranking of all other theories. There are two errors in reasoning that are being made here. To start, there is [Circular Reasoning](Circular%20Reasoning.md). It can be broken down as: * **Premise**: Philosophy is the least foundational field. * **Argument**: In the hierarchy of theories, mathematics and physics are the most foundational, while philosophy is the least foundational. This hierarchy was constructed via philosophical argument. The argument loops back on itself by saying, in effect, “philosophy is the least foundational theory, and we know this because of arguments rooted in philosophy (because it was at the top of the hierarchy, that was constructed via philosophical arguments).” The next error is that of [Self-Referential Inconsistency](Self-Referential%20Inconsistency.md). It can be broken down as: * **The Claim**: Philosophy is unreliable. Other fields are more reliable, as we can show via philosophical arguments. * **The Inconsistency**: To judge *any* field’s reliability, one must rely on philosophy—specifically, philosophical principles of knowledge, evidence, and reasoning. By labeling philosophy as unreliable while using it to justify reliability, the claim [contradicts](Contradiction.md) itself. If we can't rely on philosophy, then we can't make *any claims* about the reliability of other fields. We must accept that they are all equally (un)reliable. In trying to rank fields by reliability, we can point out a paradox: dismissing philosophy as unreliable overlooks the fact that philosophy is fundamental to defining and justifying the very concepts of “reliability” and “knowledge.” Without philosophy, we wouldn’t have clear frameworks for what makes mathematics or physics reliable. So, this criticism unintentionally reveals philosophy’s unique role—it’s not just another field; it’s a foundational discipline that informs and evaluates all others. So we have already shown that this hierarchy has errors in terms of philosophy. Can it be salvaged if we just place philosophy at the bottom along side mathematics? At that point would it still be correct to say that "biology" was less fundamental? I would argue that this question ceases to exist if we focus on [Explanations](Explanations.md)[^1]. If we follow a [Problem Driven Epistemology](Problem%20Driven%20Epistemology.md) that focus's on explanations, we see that the hierarchy simply ceases to be meaningful. [Explanations Are Justified By Their Superior Ability to Solve Problems They Address](Explanations%20Are%20Justified%20By%20Their%20Superior%20Ability%20to%20Solve%20Problems%20They%20Address.md). They are not justified by the means by which they were derived! They are justified by their superior ability, relative to rival explanations, to solve the problems they address. [Again: There is no Hierarchy of Theories](Fabric%20of%20Reality.md#Interlude%20There%20is%20no%20Hierarchy%20of%20Theories). --- Date: 20240905 Links to: [Fabric of Reality](Fabric%20of%20Reality.md) pg 20 Tags: References: * []() [^1]: If I'm being honest, the above arguments pointing out the errors in the this hierarchy are not really essential. They do correctly identify problems with the hierarchy, but the main argument against it is it's lack of focus on explanation.